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How thought is mapped into words
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To English speakers, the distinctions between blue and green, cup and glass, or cut
and break seem self-evident. The intuition is that these words label categories that
have an existence independent of language, and languagemerely captures the pre-
existing categories. But cross-linguistic work shows that the named distinctions
are not nearly as self-evident as they may feel. There is diversity in how languages
divide up domains including color, number, plants and animals, drinking vessels
and household containers, body parts, spatial relations, locomotion, acts of
cutting and breaking, acts of carrying and holding, and more. Still, studies
documenting variability across languages also uncover striking commonalities.
Such commonalities indicate that there are sources of constraint on the variation.
Both the commonalities and divergences carry important lessons for Cognitive
Science. They speak to the causal relations among language, thought, and culture;
the possibility of cross-culturally shared aspects of perception and cognition; the
methods needed for studying general-purpose, nonlinguistic concepts; and how
languages are learned.  2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
When English speakers talk or write, theyroutinely distinguish colors called blue from
those called green, drinking vessels called cup from
those called glass, and actions called cutting from
those called breaking. These distinctions seem self-
evident to the native speaker. The intuition is that
words for them exist because these words are labeling
things (properties, objects, or relations) that are
intrinsically different from one another. That is,
the distinctions have an existence independent of
language, and language, sensibly, acknowledges them
by providing words to capture them.
This intuition carries the implication that many
of the word meanings of English would be shared by
everyone, regardless of language or culture. The word
forms, of course, would differ. Words for English blue
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and green would sound like French (bleu and vert),
Spanish (azul and verde), or Turkish (mavi and yes¸il),
and so on—but themeaningswould be parallel. At first
glance, this intuition seems reasonable. After all, blue
looks different from green, cups have different shapes
and uses from glasses, and so on. These differences
ought to be noted and encoded in words by speakers
of all languages.
But this logic is really just re-stating the original
intuition. A closer look shows why it does not
necessarily hold up. Consider the case of color.
Light waves vary continuously in length, and the
human eye is capable of discriminating millions of
different hues from one another.1 Or take drinking
vessels. They come in china tea cups and tall water
glasses, but they also come in tall plastic cups, short,
roundish brandy glasses, medium paper cups, and
many other combinations of size, shape, material, and
use. Languages never provide unique labels for every
discriminable variation within a domain. Doing so
would create a huge burden for language acquisition
and for memory. Instead, words encode only a
small fraction of all perceivable distinctions in the
world.2,3 This fact does not create a serious obstacle
to communication, because a finite set of words can
be combined in an infinite number of ways to convey
additional subtleties of meaning. A particular shade
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of blue can be described in English as deep blue,
cornflower blue, deep cornflower blue, blue like the
stone in your ring, and so on. From this perspective,
and given the vast number of perceivable distinctions
in the world that could be labeled, one could entertain
the opposite possibility that languages will rarely
coincide in the distinctions they encode in words,
especially those languages that are not closely related.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE
MAPPING FROM THOUGHT
TO WORDS
Understanding to what extent there are shared
aspects of word meaning across languages, and where
similarities or differences come from, has important
implications for Cognitive Science. To whatever
extent commonalities are identified, they stand to
provide important lessons about the nature of human
cognition. They help address the broad question of the
causal direction of the relation between language and
thought. Language broadly could be ‘a cloak following
the contours of thought’, or individual languages
could be ‘molds into which infant minds are poured’.2
The discovery of commonalities places limits on the
extent to which language may mold minds. To the
extent that commonalities are found, further questions
are inspired: Do humans observe structure in theworld
so salient that certain groupings are ‘crying out to
be named’?4 And are there other principles reflected
in word meanings despite differing languages and
cultures? Candidates include universals of perception
and cognition, forces shaping the communication
process, and shared human goals, motivations, and
practices. In light of recent concerns that much of
cognition and even basic perceptual processes may be
more culture-specific than previously assumed,5 and
that there are no universals of language,6 evidence in
favor of commonalities would provide bounds on the
nature of culture-specificity.
Understanding what diversity exists is an
essential first step in addressing the possible influence
of language on thought with regard to the lexicon.
To the extent that diversity exists, a more detailed
understanding of its nature and where it comes from
also helps disentangle the relations among language,
thought, and culture. For instance, if some pattern
of lexicalization in a language reflects a cultural
practice of its speakers,7 then any parallelism between
language and thought in that instance may reflect
the impact of the culture on thought rather than
the impact of language on thought. Diversity also
raises challenges for the widespread practice of using
words of a single language such as English to
identify nonlinguistic concepts assumed to be shared
across speakers of other languages.8 Finally, diversity
raises important issues about how children learn
their native language(s) and the process of mastering
other languages later in life. We will consider these
implications after reviewing the evidence.
DIVERSITY IS PERVASIVE
A surge of research comparing word meanings across
languages in the past decades has begun to shed light
on the issues and possibilities just described. One
clear-cut finding is that there is widespread diversity.
Some degree of diversity has been found across every
domain that has been scrutinized. These domains
include color, taste, odor, concrete objects and parts
of objects, spatial relations, kinship, and actions
including human locomotion, cutting and breaking,
and carrying and holding.
If the diversity observed were a matter of simple
variation in how fine-grained the distinctions are in a
domain, the interpretation would be straightforward.
Perhaps people from various cultures simply differ
in how much they routinely need to differentiate
within a domain. The apocryphal case of Eskimo
snow words would be an example (if it were true9,10).
In a culture where snow is highly important, speakers
might develop more words to talk about kinds of
snow. Skiers, if not Eskimos, have developed an
elaborated snow lexicon, and experts in many fields do
in their domain of expertise. But the relations among
meanings are more complex than merely ‘having more
words’. There can be multiple differences within a
domain. For instance, English in and Dutch in are
similar in meaning, but Dutch divides English on
into two distinct terms: op which is used when the
spatial arrangement is stable (as for a plate on a
table), and aan which is used when it is less so (wind
might cause the clothes to fly off the washline so
the preposition of choice is aan).11 Many languages,
like Guugu Yimithirr spoken in Australia, do not
have terms for left of and right of . Such languages
usually do have terms for left and right hand, but
they do not extend these to spatial descriptions.12,13
English distinguishes brother from sister and mother
from father on the basis of gender but not cousins,
although French does (cousin versus cousine). English
does not, however, lexically distinguish whether the
siblings are older or younger; whereas most languages
do.14 English recognizes mother with a label distinct
from mother’s sister and father’s sister (aunt) but
in Hawaiian, a mother, mother’s sister, and father’s
sister are all called by the same term.15 An example of
cross-cutting categories would be English and Navajo
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terms for actions involving grasping an object and
either standing ormovingwith it. English distinguishes
holding from carrying, regardless of how the object is
being held, based on whether the person is standing
still or taking the object somewhere. Navajo terms,
however, are used across a variety of situations that
English distinguishes. Aside from carrying and holding
actions, Navajo terms apply to throwing, putting, and
other acts upon the object. However, Navajo does
make a distinction based on the nature of the object
and how it is supported by the person: in both arms,
on the back, held at the side, etc.16 In this sort of case,
entirely different dimensions are used in dividing up
the action space by name.
These examples defeat the lay intuition that
English words label unique partitions of the world,
and that many of the word meanings of English should
therefore be shared by everyone, regardless of lan-
guage or culture. But these case studies, by themselves,
say little about the balance between diversity and com-
monality, or what the sources of each might be. For
this, amore detailed examination of the data is needed.
DOMAINS IN DETAIL
As the preceding examples suggest, researchers have
examined varied domains of human experience when
considering how experiences are mapped onto words.
These domains can be grouped roughly into three
categories: Properties (such as color, taste, and odor);
objects (human-made and natural) and their parts; and
relations between entities (including those involving
spatial location, kinship, and how one entity acts upon
another). We now consider each of these categories in
turn. Our review does not exhaust every domain that
has been investigated, by any means, but highlights
major trends and issues pursued.
Properties
In the study of word meaning, most ink has been
shed in the domain of color, which has also become
the paradigmatic example of how to (and how not
to) compare lexicons across languages. The lynchpin
empirical study on the topic was conducted by Brent
Berlin and Paul Kay.17 They demonstrated that
large-scale systematic comparison of word meaning
across languages was possible and the results illu-
minating. They also developed some key distinctions
still in use today. They defined ‘basic’ color words as
contrastive, nonoverlapping terms that are assumed
to exhaustively partition color space. These can be
identified by a number of criteria, including the fact
that they are a single word (not a complex phrase);
they are not linked to specific sources (as are, for
example, lime-colored and salmon-colored); and they
are not loan words from a foreign language. Berlin
and Kay also distinguished between the extension
or boundaries of a word’s meaning and its central
or focal point, a distinction which was to be very
important in future work.
The major finding from their study was that
languages differ in their repertoire of basic color
words. Some languages have only two basic color
terms, while others have three, four, five, or more.
Despite this variation in number, color lexicons show
astonishing regularities, too. Berlin and Kay proposed
that the cap on the number of basic color words was
eleven, as illustrated by English black, white, red,
yellow, green, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and
grey. Over the years, there have been proposals for
additional basic categories but these claims have been
contested.18,19 Nevertheless, using a number of mea-
sures it is clear now that many languages have 12 basic
color terms consisting of Berlin and Kay’s original 11
plus a distinction between light and dark blue. These
languages include Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Italian,
Spanish, Greek, Turkish, Japanese, and Chinese,20–23
while Korean is said to have 15 basic color words.24,25
Berlin and Kay classified languages according to
how many basic color terms each had. Based on this
typology, an implicational hierarchy of how color
lexicons evolve was then constructed. For instance, if
a language had a word for yellow, it would also have
a word for black, white, and red. The regularity with
which languages follow this pattern reinforces the
notion that color vocabularies develop under similar
constraints.
Critics26–30 of Berlin and Kay pointed out,
however, that there were problems in the number
and sampling of languages, the choice of participants
(who were a small number of bilingual speakers
from similar backgrounds), and the language data
(which came in part from these speakers and in part
from dictionaries). So although Berlin and Kay17 felt
that ‘color words translate too easily among various
pairs of unrelated languages for the extreme linguistic
relativity thesis to be valid’, a few years later Lyons31
said of the same data ‘it is a well-established fact
that word-for-word translation of color terms across
languages is frequently impossible’. These contrasting
views illustrated another problem: the need for
statistical testing of the data to objectively measure
the degree of correspondence between languages.
The World Color Survey32 sought to address
these concerns and produced further evidence for
constraints on color word meaning. Data from
110 unwritten languages were collected from large
 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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numbers of native speakers using Munsell color chips
and were then modeled statistically. The outcome was
that color terms are not randomly distributed over
color space.33 Across languages, the best examples of
color terms cluster together,34 and each language’s set
of color terms partition color space so that similarity
is maximized within categories and minimized
between them.35,36
In light of the evidence that color lexicons
exhibit both diversity (in size) and constraints (on
where boundaries and focal points occur), many now
acknowledge that arguing over universality versus
culture-specificity is hampering progress.37,38 There
has been an important shift in the questions asked,
with exciting new ideas emerging about possible
constraints and variation in this domain. For example,
are the shared elements of color naming a result
of how the physical environment is perceived,39,40
irregularities of the perceptual color space,35,41 or
a product of how convergence on a shared set
of names is achieved by members of a language
community for communicative efficiency?42 Each of
these proposals has received some support (and they
are not necessarily mutually exclusive).
In terms of variation, could different terminolo-
gies be the result of different environments—urban,
desert, or jungle, for example? Or might they be
the product of differences in sunlight? Lindsey and
Brown43,44 suggest that increased exposure to UV-
B light may make people on the equator less able
to perceive the differences between blue and green
because of physiological changes to the lens, which
in turn leads to collapsing the blue–green area under
a single term. A recent study lends further weight
in this direction: People born in the winter months
above the Arctic Circle demonstrate differences in
color discrimination compared to those born below
the Arctic circle.45,46 However, a direct link between
changes in perception and color naming has still to be
established.47,48 Another possibility is that individual
differences within populations may cause differences
in color lexicons. For instance, differences in the inci-
dence of color-blindness in different populations may
lead to shifts in the lexicon due to pressures for a
common effective language code.49,50
Yet a third possibility is that the lexical differ-
ences result from variable cultural practices.27,29,36
One prime candidate is the development of dyeing
technology. The colors of familiar objects account
for the most obvious etymologies and semantic asso-
ciations across languages.28,51 For example, English
orange (from an Arabic loan word) was used only
as a fruit name for 300 years after its introduction to
the language. It was not until the 17th century that
it gained its status as a color term. Many other color
words come from dyes. For example, the term purple
comes from the name of a Mediterranean shell fish,
but it came into prominence because it was a highly
prized dye. In the Middle Ages the form was purpur,
which became purpel in the 15th century. Included
in earlier color meanings were many shades of red,
as well as darker blues and purples, a fact that is
most likely related to variations in the dye-stuffs. The
termmauve appears from 1856with the advent of new
dyes, and so on.51 Languages borrow terms from other
languages and all rapidly expand their color vocab-
ulary when in contact with technologically advanced
cultures, suggesting a strong role of culture and tech-
nology as well as the relevance of language contact in
explanations of naming patterns. Although plausibly
important, there is not yet any mechanistic account
or formal test of how color vocabulary might change
and spread.
Astonishingly little is known about vocabu-
lary for other sensory domains. At the turn of the
previous century, there were two large-scale ques-
tionnaire/observational surveys on taste lexicons52,53
which demonstrated comparable variation in this
domain. There has been very little pursuit since.
Some recent studies begin to redress this gap, and
they show comparable variation in terms for other
perceptual properties.54 Languages differ markedly in
their lexicons for smell,55–60 touch,61–63 sound,64–66
temperature,67,68 and pain.69–71 Explanations offered
for some of the observed variation include (1) that sub-
sistence patterns may impact smell lexicons59 and (2)
that culinary traditions could shape taste lexicons.72
Further research is necessary to test these and other
possible causal determinants of lexical elaboration
and change in these domains.
Finally, if the quantity of items in a collection can
be thought of as a property of the collection, a recent
literature on numeration systems is relevant here.73–76
It is possible that the use of fingers and toes for count-
ing feeds into the nature of verbal numeration systems
and contributes to the frequency of systems based on 5,
10, or 20. However, whether body counting sequences
emerged before verbal numeration systems and have a
direct causal influence has not been established.77 Even
if there is a causal relation, however, abundant diver-
sity exists. For instance, despite common origins in a
base-10 system, Polynesian and Micronesian counting
systems have diverged over time. Polynesian languages
usually contain, in addition to the abstract numeration
system, specialized counting sequences that apply to
specific types of objects and that entail different count-
ing units. Micronesian languages, on the other hand,
tend to incorporate numeral classifiers from their
 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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syntax into their numeration systems.76 (Numeral
classifiers are grammatical morphemes that accom-
pany nouns in statements of quantity in some
languages but need not be informative by themselves
regarding quantity.) The differing systems may reflect
both the cultural importance of tracking the flow of
large quantities of goods or people, as well as proper-
ties of the language structure (i.e., morpho-syntax).76
Numeration systems of dramatically different sorts,
such as those having only a few, imprecise words
for quantities may, conversely, reflect lack of cultural
need.78,79
Objects and Their Parts
Work on labeling of objects across languages has
largely taken place in two traditions. One is about how
different cultures ‘classify’ plants and animals. Because
the study of ‘classification’ schemes has depended
heavily on observations about what things are given
the same name, the data are relevant for the current
purposes. The other tradition is about how people
label human-made objects across languages. Despite
different methodologies and objects of study, early
work in the two traditions shared a seminal idea. This
idea, adopted from biology, was that there are natural
discontinuities in the distribution of properties of
living things that produce groupings of things evident
to all observers.4,80 This proposal suggests the world
provides a strong constraint on naming.
The idea that natural discontinuities would be
respected by all observers in classification, regardless
of culture, provided a counterpoint to the possibility
that cultures each construct their own way of
organizing the world81,82 based on the practical
value of the plants or animals to the culture.83 It
is difficult to directly compare classification across
cultures because existent plants and animals differ by
location. The strategy was therefore to see whether
classification systems in individual cultures are similar
to those developed by Western science. Studies
of nonindustrialized cultures showed substantial
correspondence of folk to scientific classification.
In one of the most extensive programs of research,
Berlin analyzed folk classification systems for plants
among the Tzeltal Maya of Mexico and the Aguaruna
Jivaro of Peru.4 He found that about 60% of labeled
groupings corresponded closely to species identified
by botanists. In another extensive study, Hunn80
examined classification of animals by the Tzeltal using
a measure that took into account correspondence of
folk categories to scientific groupings at levels not
restricted to species and found an even higher level
of correspondence. Data from these and other studies
support the idea that named groupings of plants and
animals reflect clusters of correlated properties.84–87
The correspondences to scientific classification
are not perfect, of course. Some divergences are
inevitable because lay people do not have access
to all of the information used to make scientific
classifications. But other types of divergences occur as
well. Larger organisms, being perceptually prominent,
are more likely to be finely discriminated,88 suggesting
that salience of the organism matters. Some named
groupings at a higher level of abstraction, like
English bush versus tree, may be based on their
relation to human height. In addition, the degree
of differentiation may vary due to cultural utilities.
For instance, communities that depend on fish as
food may discriminate more fish species by name
than bird species.83 Finally, specific belief systems can
influence naming practices. For instance, one term
that encompassed most birds for the Karam of New
Guinea excluded the cassowary, which has a special
cultural status not granted to other birds.89 (See Refs
84, 87 for further discussion of divergences.)
Early work on artifact labeling was also
influenced by the idea of natural discontinuities in
the world. Rosch and colleagues,90,91 echoing Berlin
and Hunn, suggested that artifacts fall into natural
groups given by correlational structure in the world.
They found evidence that members of English noun
categories such as chair, car, and apple share many
properties with other things called by the same name
and few with things called by contrasting names.
Perhaps implicitly assuming some constraint along
these lines, others have suggested that common
nouns for concrete objects should have similar
meanings across languages.92–95 But a different
picture emerged from empirical tests. In one study96
comparing naming patterns for 11 drinking vessels in
English, Hebrew, and Japanese, three different ways
of segmenting them were found. English speakers
distinguished cup from glass. Hebrew speakers made
a different two-way distinction, separating coffee
and tea cups from all the rest. Japanese made a
three-way distinction with wine glass split off under
its own name. A recent study97 comparing English
and Russian naming patterns for 60 drinking vessels
found similar divergences. There is no single set of
named distinctions for drinking vessels dictated by
clusters of correlated properties in the world.
Household objects other than drinking vessels
show the same diversity.98,99 When speakers of
English, Spanish, and Mandarin named various con-
tainers, the dominant responses for English speakers
were bottle, jar, or container. For the same objects
Spanish speakers used many more terms, and the
 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Mandarin speakers looked different yet again from
English and Spanish speakers.98 Similar differences
were found between Dutch and French speakers in
Belgium, despite the fact the language groups live
in close proximity and largely share culture.99 The
patterns were not completely unrelated to each other,
however. For instance, all 19 objects called jar in
English were included under a single term in the other
two languages. Some distinctions appear to be salient
enough to be observed by all. Why, then, is there so
much variability in this domain? Multidimensional
scaling solutions of similarity sorting of the objects in
the same studies provide some insight. Some objects
(such as those labeled jar in English) do form clusters
in the similarity space, but others are scattered fairly
continuously throughout the space, providing no
clear perceptual segmentation. Where discontinuities
exist in the domain, naming patterns may respect
them, but the world seems to provide less structure
here than it does in the case of plants and animals.
But the existence of fewer constraints does not
reveal what creates the observed variation. Potential
contributors include historical sociocultural factors,
such as what containers were invented/available in
each culture and how they were incorporated into
the lexicon over time. Also potentially influencing the
observed pattern are the morpho-syntactic properties
of the languages. For instance, Spanish easily forms
new names for containers by adding suffixes to root
morphemes (e.g., -era added to talc produces talquera,
a container for dispensing talc). This linguistic
property lends itself to more flexible differentiation
within the container lexicon for Spanish.100
Another interesting domain for assessment is
body parts, because joints create a segmentation
of the human body that is both visually and
kinesthetically salient. Arguably, humans around the
world experience the body and its segmentation with
little variation. If salient discontinuities in the world
constrain labeling, a high degree of consistency in
naming patterns might be expected. For instance,
one might predict that languages will tend to label
the head, trunk, arm (and perhaps hand), and leg
(and perhaps foot).101 Case studies of body part
terms across diverse languages reveal that there is
far from universal recognition of these units with
unique terms.102,103 For instance, some languages
lack a word for the head,104 and some label arms and
legs together with only a single word.105 Some give
a single term to the foot plus leg (and some do so
for the arm plus hand), while others distinguish foot,
lower leg (up to the knee) and upper leg. The joints
thus do not produce a single shared naming scheme
across languages. Still, there are commonalities in that
terms for limbs are often bounded by joints.102,103
For instance, it is rare (although still possible) for a
term for the leg to cover only up to mid-leg.106 While
not yielding a single way of dividing up the body, the
physical discontinuities provided by joints do seem to
provide a constraint on variation.
Finally, a recent entry into the study of the
concrete is labeling of the natural landscape.107,108
Landscape features such as mountains, rivers, and
valleys present discontinuities on the earth’s surface.
Because they are attached to or contiguous with the
earth, they could be considered more analogous to the
case of body parts than to objects. Whether considered
objects or parts, the presence of salient discontinuities
predicts shared patterns of labeling in this domain.
The available data reveal that, again, cross-linguistic
variation arises in themeanings and extensional ranges
of roughly similar terms, despite any such constraints.
For instance, the terms most similar to English
mountain in other languages are not necessarily simple
translation equivalents. In some languages, the closest
equivalent term encompasses hills or smaller features
such as crab mounds on a beach,107 or even a rock
or stone.109 Some languages appear to have forms
that crosscut familiar English terms: for instance, a
language of northwestern Australia has a word for any
landscape feature that is low, smooth, and rounded,
including a rise in a road and a rounded gully.110
Perceptual salience, cultural interests and needs, and
interactions with other language characteristics all
are likely sources of variation.107 Because the reports
in this domain to date have been case studies of
individual languages, though, it is hard to assess the
relative degree of shared versus nonshared meaning.
Relations
Some scholars92–94 have argued that cross-linguistic
variation should be most evident in the words for
relational notions, which entail interactions between
entities or components. Relations can be coded in
verbs (e.g., cut, walk), spatial prepositions (e.g., in,
on), or even nouns (e.g., mother, uncle). Perhaps the
properties of relations do not cohere as tightly together
as the properties of objects and therefore readily yield
many solutions for packaging into words.
In some domains, the basic actions expressed
in language differ as a function of which ‘covert
categories’ are implied.16 To talk about dressing, for
example, English speakers use a single expression put
on no matter what item is placed on which body
part. The covert category that is the object of putting
on, then, is the whole body. However, speakers of
Tswana, a Bantu language of Botswana, use one term
 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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for putting clothing on the extremities, including
head, hands and arm, and feet (go`rwa´la`), and a
different term for putting things on the central trunk
and legs (go`a`pa`ra`). Japanese speakers use different
verbs for placing clothing on the head (kaburu) versus
above the waist (kiru) or below the waist (haku).
Korean speakers make more distinctions again and
use different verbs if they put clothing on the head
(ssuta), trunk or legs (ipta), feet (sinta), or wrist and
waist (chata). Similarly, English speakers use carry
irrespective of what is being carriedwhere on the body,
but Mayan languages, such as Tzeltal and Tzotzil,
use distinct terms as a function of the body part
involved: back, shoulders, head, or arms. Languages
like Navajo, on the other hand, also have different
verbs depending on what type of object it is: living,
long, bulky, etc. (See also Refs 111, 112).
These examples demonstrate a form of diver-
sity distinct from the others described so far. Here,
components of an event are differentially packaged
together across languages. This holds even for how
simple movement along a trajectory is expressed in
verbs.113 Some languages, like English, typically use
verbs expressing both the fact of motion and the man-
ner of motion (e.g., slide, roll, run). Other languages,
such as Spanish, more often use verbs packaging
together the fact ofmotionwith its path (e.g., entrar ‘to
go in’, salir ‘to go out’, pasar ‘to go through’, subir ‘to
go up’). (Manner is optionally expressed in a satellite,
e.g., ‘by running’.) Still other languages, such as Atsug-
ewi, a Hokan language of California, often use verbs
that put together motion with information about the
thing moving (e.g., -caq- ‘for a slimy lumpish object
to move/be located’). These patterns of groupings are
not absolute within a language. English has verbs like
enter that conflate motion with path, and Spanish
has verbs like correr ‘run’ that express manner. Nev-
ertheless, languages differ in their dominant pattern
of use.114–116
This difference in lexical packaging could
impact naming of human locomotion. Human gaits,
such as walking and running, have characteristic
clusters of co-occurring features. In fact, as speed
increases people transition abruptly from one gait
(an alternating stride where one foot is always
on the ground) to another (an impact-and-recoil
action where both feet are off the ground at one
point) without any intermediate stage.117 Malt and
colleagues118 examined whether this biomechanical
discontinuity was recognized across languages that
came from different typological stock. Two of the
languages (English and Dutch) were of the first type
introduced above—they typically express manner in
the verb; whereas the other two languages (Spanish
and Japanese) typically express path information.
In all cases, the verbs used to describe video-
clips depicting a person moving on a treadmill
respected the discontinuity of the gaits. That is,
there was a sharp lexical boundary between ‘walking’
gaits and ‘running’ gaits. So for these basic gaits,
languages appear to categorize motions in very similar
ways, despite differences in the broader lexicalization
patterns. Despite this shared lexical recognition of
the biomechanical discontinuity, variation appeared
in how many verbs were used to name gaits in a
way consistent with the linguistic typology. English
and Dutch, the ‘manner verb languages’, made more
fine-grained distinctions.
A study of the same languages using a wider-
range of gait types119 also shows broad agreement
across languages in respecting the biomechanical
distinctions of different gait types. And, once again,
there is nevertheless considerable variation in the
number of distinctions made lexically: There were
many more dominant terms for the manner-rich
languages (e.g., 14 in English but only 5 in Spanish).
There are broad constraints from the physical
structure of locomotion, but structural properties
of the language appear to also shape individual
languages’ lexical characteristics.
Differences in the granularity of verb semantics
can be seen in another domain too—that of ‘cutting
and breaking’. In the largest study of event cate-
gorization in language to date, Majid, Boster, and
Bowerman,120,121 in collaboration with a team of
linguists, collected primary data from 28 languages.
Native speakers of a wide range of languages, includ-
ing many small-scale communities from Africa, the
Americas, Asia, and Australia, were presented with
a standardized set of video-clips depicting an agent
separating various objects. Some of the events were
reversible separations (i.e., opening events) but others
were permanent severances (e.g., cutting, breaking,
slicing, hacking). Speakers described the events in
their native language and the verbs obtained were
subjected to statistical analysis to identify the common
patterns of categorization. Across all languages, the
same semantic dimensions were uncovered. First,
all languages distinguished the reversible separations
from the permanent ones. Within those, all languages
distinguished separations with a highly predictable
end state (e.g., a knife slicing a carrot—the location
of separation is predictable from where the knife
is placed) from less predictable ones (e.g., smashing
a plate—the plate may shatter in any number
of pieces). Additional dimensions distinguished
tearing events, smashing-snapping events, and so
forth.
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Despite this uniformity in the dimensions
encoded in the verbs of the 28 languages, the
precise range of events included under individual
verbs varied. Ye´lıˆ Dnye speakers, who live on an
isolated island of Papua New Guinea, used merely
three verbs, each of which has a relatively broad
extension.122 In contrast, Tzeltal speakers from
Mexico used more than 50 different verbs, each with
subtly specific semantics.123 What accounts for this
variation? Besides the possibility of a link to structural
characteristics of the languages, culture in the form
of technology might be relevant, as it is for color
vocabulary. The homeland of Ye´lıˆ Dnye speakers,
Rossel Island, has no flint, obsidian, or other sharp
stone, and until recently, Rossel Islanders did not have
access to sharp instruments from outside. The smaller
lexicon in this domain could be the result of this
technological limitation. Technology is not the whole
story, though. For example, Dutch, Swedish, and
Mandarin have different verbs for cutting-things-with-
scissors versus for cutting-with-other-instruments, a
distinction not made in English, German, or Hindi,
even though the available instruments are similar.
Other forces not yet identified must be at play.
Similar diversity in packaging can be seen
in how speakers of different languages talk about
spatial relations11,124,125 and kinship,126–128 which
were touched upon briefly in the introduction.
These are particularly interesting because recent
investigations suggest similar forces shaping lexicons
in these domains as in others discussed earlier.
For example, across languages spatial relations
demonstrate ‘optimal partitioning’,129 as does color.35
Communication pressures for efficiency appear to
influence kinship terminologies127,128 as well as color
terms,42 and historical factors are as relevant for
kinship126 as they are for artifact terms.100 We explore
these similarities further in the next sections.
IMPLICATIONS OF COMMONALITIES
Where Commonalities Come From
Evans and Levinson,6 arguing against a nativist
account of language universals, suggest that shared
tendencies ‘ . . . emerge from the crucible of biological
and cognitive constraints, functional constraints, and
historically inherited material.’ This characterization
is compatible with the evidence discussed here. There
are broad principles at play across domains, cultures,
and languages. Relevant biological constraints include
the properties of human perceptual systems. For
instance, one possible explanation of the finding that
focal instances of color terms cluster together across
languages is that there are ‘bumps’ of particular
salience in perceptual color space.35 Among likely
cognitive constraints are the discovery of a common
set of dimensions used in naming actions.120 Despite
different specific distinctions drawn across languages,
these common dimensions imply shared sensitivity
to certain properties of events, and such shared
sensitivities may exist for other domains. Functional
constraints can be seen in numeration systems and in
the biological domain where cultural utilities influence
local practices of naming.83 There are constraints
from the structure in the physical world. Where
discontinuities in property distribution or a physical
segmentation of a domain exist, they provide a
guide for creating named groupings that appears to
dominate other ways of grouping. Communication
pressures to create simple but informative systems
provide another set of constraints.42,128 Similar
semantic systems might be found across languages
as a by-product of converging on shared names even
where there is little or no statistical structure in the
input. Finally, historically inherited material is clearly
relevant for the lexicon, because both borrowing of
terms during language contact, as well as shared
language origins, can create commonalities.98,126
The Causal Relation Between Language
and Thought
We noted at the outset that to whatever extent com-
monalities are identified in how thought is mapped to
words, they stand to provide important lessons about
the nature of human cognition. One fundamental
issue is the relation between language and thought.
The evidence reviewed here shows that, despite per-
vasive variation in word meanings across languages,
commonalities can be identified. Without denying
the possibility that language may influence thought,
the commonalities indicate that there are important
aspects of how the world is perceived and understood
that are shared across speakers of different languages.
Whatever influence language may have on thought,
it works against a background in which much may
be shared.
Could Perception and Cognition Be
Culture-Dependent All the Way Down?
The observation of commonalities, in conjunction
with their possible sources, yields a further implica-
tion. Despite concerns that many aspects of perception
or cognition identified on the basis of a single pop-
ulation may not generalize beyond that population,5
these commonalities provide some reassurance that
there may be identifiable generalities. Furthermore,
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the understanding of origins of commonalities in
naming patterns that has begun to emerge provides a
toehold into what some of those might be.
IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERSITY
Where Diversity Comes From
The evidence reviewed suggests four broad and
overlapping sets of forces creating divergences
in the way that languages segment domains by
name. Sociocultural influences include current social
organization and culture-specific beliefs, practices,
and motivations. For instance, matrilineal versus
patrilineal inheritance systems may influence kin
naming patterns;130,131 the complexity of commerce76
or cuisines72 may influence numeration or taste
systems; beliefs about properties of certain animals
may influence the extension of an animal term.89
Sociocultural influences also include cultural history,
since the pattern of lexicalization present at a
given moment is a function not only of current
speakers’ experiences but many years of cultural and
linguistic evolution. For instance, development of dye
technology may have led over time to elaboration
of color vocabulary;51,132 earlier eras of the vessels
used for containing in a culture may have shaped
the set of container terms passed forward even as
some disappear from current use.98,133 Influences of
the physical environment will feed into the socio-
cultural influences, since variation in materials for
creating tools,122 color in the landscape and landscape
forms,27,28 and the plants and animals present84,87 will
help shape cultural practices and with it language.
The physical environment may also influence human
sensory systems,39 and through that, what is
considered name-worthy, as in the proposal that color
vision changes with latitude.43,46 Linguistic influences
encompass the impact of language structure, such that
morpho-syntactic possibilities,100 typical patterns of
conflation of information in verbs,113 and presence or
absence of a numeral classifier system74 are reflected in
the lexical structure of a domain. Linguistic influences
also come in the form of language contact, which
can cause convergences (by adding to a language’s
lexicon, with attendant adjustment of word meanings
within the semantic field) as well as divergences
(because differential patterns of contact can cause
previously similar languages to evolve in different
directions). Finally, population variability is a recent
entry into the arena with the suggestion that incidence
of color blindness in a population may influence
what color distinctions can successfully be used in
language.43,44,49,134
Where and Under What Circumstances May
Language Influence Thought?
The studies we reviewed provide rich information
about diversity in how languages divide the world
up by name. They offer not only the conclusion
that diversity is pervasive but many details about its
manifestation across languages and domains. These
differences provide fertile grounds for future studies
of where lexical diversity may have an influence
on thought. But much research on the possible
influence of language on thought has proceeded
without consideration of the origins of the diversity in
question. The studies reviewed here provide insights
into possible origins of diversity, as discussed above.
These insights give hints about where parallelism
between language and thought may be mediated
by culture rather than directly from language to
thought. They also raise a further point to consider.
The fact that current naming patterns can reflect
historical and not current cultural conditions might
argue that these naming patterns are not optimal for
contemporary action on the world and so, in such
cases, independence of thought from language can be
found.133 The fact that, synchronically, language and
culture do not correlate perfectly makes this area of
research an experimentalist’s dream since it provides
the possibility of teasing apart the effect of each.
Cases where current naming patterns do not reflect
distinctions of current cultural importance can be
examined and compared to cases of the converse for
their relative impact on thought.
Using Words to Find Concepts
Philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive neuroscien-
tists have devotedmuch effort to the study of concepts,
generally taken to be general-purpose representations
not directly derived from linguistic knowledge. Diver-
sity challenges the widespread practice of using words
of a single language (e.g., triangle, table, robin), to
identify the concepts to be studied. If the words of a
language can reveal these general-purpose concepts,
then a sizeable portion of these concepts must be
directly given by language and must vary consid-
erably across speakers of different languages.135,136
On the other hand, if the concepts are taken to
be shared across speakers of different languages,
then words of a single language are of little use in
identifying them. New approaches to finding nonlin-
guistic conceptual content are needed, including using
information extracted from aggregating words across
languages to identify shared underlying components
of domain knowledge.8,120,137
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Word Learning
Diversity across languages in how words partition
domains highlights the challenges for language
learning. If naming patterns for many domains vary
from language to language, then much of what a
child learns about word meanings and usage must be
language-specific and not fully given by pre-linguistic
understanding of the world.11,138 A study of naming
patterns for common household artifacts by Dutch-
speaking Belgian children found that the children were
14 years old before they fully matched the naming
patterns of the adults, even though they had the
terms used by adults in their productive vocabularies
earlier.139 This extended learning needed to master
a single language’s naming pattern implies that the
challenges are greater when learning two or more
languages in parallel or a second one after a first has
been acquired. Nonnative speakers of English who
have been immersed in English for up to 18 years still
deviate significantly from the native speakers in their
use of some common words.140 Furthermore, those
who acquire two languages in parallel use the words
of the two languages in ways distinct from those of
monolingual speakers of the languages,99 and second-
language speakers who spend considerable time in the
second-language environment may begin to show an
influence of the second-language usage patterns on
word use in their own native language.97,141,142
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A difficulty in drawing conclusions about common-
alities and diversity across studies lies in the varying
research methodologies used. There are many beauti-
fully rich case studies of individual languages. Looking
across these studies, one can see that diversity in how
domains are lexicalized is substantial. However, by
themselves these reports provide little information
about the extent or nature of any commonalities (and,
as such, may also foster an impression that diversity is
unconstrained). Even when commonalities are exam-
ined, different methods are used and the focus is on
different aspects of the problem. Some evaluate con-
formity of lexical category boundaries to an external
(nonpsychological) standard;4,80,118 some the optimal-
ity of the categories;35,129 some whether prototypes
are similar across languages;34,100 some whether there
are shared dimensions involved in making whatever
lexical distinctions exist.120,121 The differing emphases
leave open the possibility of as-yet-unexplored com-
monalities. For instance, although artifact terms may
vary across languages in their prototypes and bound-
aries, they still may be based on contrasts on the
same dimensions, but no direct test has yet been
made of this aspect of the data. Further studies
applying consistent data collection techniques and
formal methods of analysis will help answer the most
fundamental questions about where meaning comes
from.
CONCLUSION
English is but one of thousands of languages spoken
today. The meanings encoded by its words, although
feeling obvious to native speakers, are by no means
the only way to carve up the world. The languages
spoken today showcase the diverging sociocultural,
environmental and linguistic histories each language
has undergone. Full one-to-one correspondence of
word meanings is rare, if attested at all. Despite these
divergences, there are recurring patterns to be found
that point to a set of domain-general constraints on
how word meaning and patterns of word use develop.
The commonalities and divergences carry important
implications for Cognitive Science about the causal
relations among language, thought, and culture,
the possibility of cross-culturally shared aspects of
perception and cognition, the methods needed for
studying general-purpose, nonlinguistic concepts, and
how languages are learned.
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